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Lecturer on Government, Harvard University
When the second session of the Sixty-sixth Congress adjourned
on June 5th in order that the members might attend the party con-
ventions, Pi'esident Wilson had failed to sign nine bills and two joint
resolutions. It was taken as a matter of course that these eleven
measures had been killed by a pocket veto, since except in one almost
forgotten instance which occurred while Lincoln was President, the
uniform federal practice has been that bills not signed before an
adjournment of Congress failed to become law. In order to prevent
this, chief executives have gone to the President's room in the capitol
and have put their signatures to bills as soon as they came through
the legislative hopper during the expiring hours of congressional
sessions.' This was President Wilson's practice when the condition
of congressional business required, and his health permitted it.
Of the ten public measures which he had not signed when Congress
adjourned on June 5th, nine had been presented to him the same day.
Two appropriation bills were sent to him on June 3d and three on
June 4 th. All five bear the date of June 5th and in addition, there
were forty-six other measures which were signed on the last day of
the Congress.2 A number of these ranked among the more important
laws which were passed, and it must have been difficult, if not impos-
sible, to give them other than a perfunctory examination before
'For an early instance of this practice see 7 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams
(1875) 233.
'A list is given in the MONTHLY COMPENDIUM (June, ig2o, 66th Cong., 2d
sess.) 170.
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4 P. .M. on June 5th. The number of laws sent to him on the last day,
as well as the fact that he did not go to the capitol, may have prevented
President Wilson from considering the eleven measures which
remained unsigned when Congress adjourned.
But the Water Power Bill (H. R. 3184), creating a Federal Power
Commission-perhaps the most important law which remained un-
signed-had been sent to the President on May 3Ist. It may have
been overlooked in the final congestion, or the approval of cabinet
members to whom it had been referred may have. been delayed. The
President may have been anxious that it become law, or he may have
wished to use it as a test case to determine whether the executive
could escape from the dilemma of hasty approval or "pocket vetoes"
which is forced upon him by the congressional practice of rushing
bills through during the final moments. At all events, he selected
from the eleven unsigned bills those that he desired to become law
and fixed his signature after the adjournment of Congress. This
action was based- on an opinion from Attorney General Palmer and
was accompanied 'by the following statement from the White House:
"The President, having been advised by the Attorney General in
a formal opinion that the adjournment of Congress does not deprive
him of the io days allowed by the Constitution for the consideration
of a measure, but only in case of disapproval, of the opportunity to
return the measure with his reasons to the House in which it origi-
nated, has signed the following bills, each within the Io-day period,
of course. The bills not signed failed to become law under the usual
practice." s
Of the measures signed by the President after the adjournment
of Congress, the only one likely to get into the courts is the Water
Power Law (June IO, 1920; Public No. 28o). Mr. Wilson's innova-
tion, as I have indicated, is to be commended on the ground that it
will permit the Executive to give to bills coming to him on the last
'The bills referred to as having been signed following the adjournment of
Congress were:
H. R. 3184, water-power bill (Public 28o).
H. R. 6407, for relief of Michael MacGarvey for damage caused to set of
false teeth (Private 73).
H. R. 13962, bridge, Monongahela River, Pa. (Public 283).
H. R. 13976, bridge, Allegheny River, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Public 284).
H. R. 13977, bridge, Allegheny River, Milvale, Pa. (Public 285).
H. R. 13978, bridge, Ohio River, McKee's Rocks, Pa. (Public 286).
S. 547, to authorize enlistment of non-English speaking citizens and aliens in
Army '(Public 281).
S. 4167, bridge, Mississippi River, St. Louis, Mo. (Public 282).
The bills not signed and failing to. become laws "under the usual practice"
(pocket vetoes) were:
H. R. 13329, surplus road machinery bill.
H. J. Res. 373, repeal of war laws.
S. J. Res. x52, Canadian wood pulp resolution.
POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO SIGN BILLS
few days of a Congress the same mature consideration that he is
allowed with respect to measures passed earlier in the session. It is
worth while, therefore, to attempt to determine how far post-adjourn-
ment approval is constitutionally justified.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
The language of the Constitution giving the President power to
approve or disapprove bills passed by Congress is as follows:
"Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives
and the Senate shall, 'before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President of the United States; if he approve, he shall sign it, but
if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in which
it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on
their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. . . . [Provisions follow
with reference to overriding the veto.] If any bill shall not be
returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after
it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be .a law, in like
manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their'adjourn-
ment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law."4
Vague as this grant of power is with respect to the problem under
discussion, it nevertheless indicates rather definitely the methods by
which bills become laws or are rejected by the Executive. Disapproval
can be shown in two ways: (I) by veto and return of the measure
to the House in which it originated, or (2) by failing to sign measures
which are passed within ten days of adjournment. In the first case
the bill fails if Congress does not override the veto; in the second case
Congress, having adjourned, has no redress. Bills of this class are
said to receive a "pocket veto," 5 and three measures were thus dis-
posed of -by President Wilson when he initiated the practice of signing
bills after an adjournment.
"Art. I, sec. 7.
"'There is a kind of bastard veto, which I have referred to as the 'pocket
veto,' and which is plainly an abuse, unauthorized by the Constitution, and an
invasion of the rights of the people. and of their representatives." John D.
Long, The Use and Abuse of the Veto Power (Nov. 1887) 4 THE FoRum,'253,
26o. Mr. Long maintained that the Constitution required the President to
return bills of which he disapproved. Congress by adjournment can release
him from the duty, but he cannot release himself. If the President simply
kills a bill by keeping it in his "pocket" over an adjournment, he deprives
Congress of its constitutional right of reconsideration. "If the two facts
could be made clear, first that the President does not approve the bill, and
second, that his failure to return it with his objections is not caused by the
approaching adjournment of Congress, but by his own purpose either to avoid
an issue or to defeat Congressional reconsideration, why, then, would he not be
impeachable? . . . In such a case there is certainly a marked abuse of the
veto power; and, while it cannot be reached by any remedial judicial process,
it is a fit subject for popular criticism." (p. 261.)
The constitutionality of "pocket vetoes" was also questioned by Henry Clay.
See Register of Debates (23d Cong., ist sess.) I4-I& See infra, note z7.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Again, neither the language of the Constitution nor the uniform
practice leaves any doubt concerning the methods by which bills may
become law: they may be (i) passed by Congress and approved by
the President within ten days; (2) passed by Congress, returned by
the President with his objections, and passed over his veto; and (3)
passed by Congress and kept by the President longer than ten days
while Congress remains in session. In some cases Chief Executives
have deliberately allowed measures to become laws by the last method
because, although they did not wish to exercise their- veto power,6
they nevertheless desired that Congress bear the whole responsibility.
During President Wilson's illness and inability twenty-eight bills be-
came law without his signature.
7
The mandate of the Constitution is clear so long as Congress remains
in session; but the situation when Congress adjourrms is not so obvious.
Apparently it was not thought of in the Federal Convention; the
framers were chiefly concerned with fixing the location of the check
on the legislature and determining whether it should be absolute or
qualified.8  While they did not expressly permit the signing of bills
after the adjournment, at least they did not explicitly forbid it. Can
such a prohibition be implied from the language of the Constitution?
It would seem that the answer to this question depends on whether
the phrase "in which case it shall not be law" is an absolute inhibi-
tion applying. to all bills unsigned at the time of adjournment, or
whether it is simply an exception to the provision that bills kept by
the President for ten days without acting on them become law with-
out his signature. The obvious purpose of the whole sentence is
two-fold. In the first place, coupled with the requirement that Con-
gress consider the reasons for a veto and vote on them, the provision
seeks to avoid any unreasonable delay. Secondly-and this is more
important-if no time limit were fixed, the President could nullify
the legislature's prerogative of attempting by a two-thirds vote to
override his objections. He need only ignore bills which had been sent
to him.9
8 The practice of allowing bills to become law without the signature of the
President under the ten day rule was begun in Buchanan's administration. He
did it in two cases and succeeding Presidents made use of the practice as
follows: Lincoln, i; Johnson, 18; Grant, 136; Hayes, a; Arthur, 13; Cleve-
land, 283. See E. C. Mason, The Veto Power (i8go) Appendix D, where the
list is given. Mason (p. 113) gives some instances in which veto messages have
been sent after the ten day period had expired. President Wilson approved a
number of bills while he was in Paris, within ten days, of course, after they
were actually presented to him by the courier who took them to Europe. Cf.
my -article American Government and Politics (igig) 14 AM. Po. ScI. REv.
74, 87, note 7.
Ibid. Cf. also my article, Presidential Inability (May 8, 1920) 2 THE REvIEw,
481.
8 z Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention (1907) 21 passin.
"'But the President might effectually defeat the wholesome restraint, thus
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On the other hand, the Constitution provides that when the Presi-
dent vetoes a bill, he must return it with his objections. Were there
no exception as to adjournment, Congress might nullify the executive
prerogative of conditional disapproval by passing a measure, adjourn-
ing before it could be considered by the Executive, and thus preventing
its return. Without the exception such a measure would become a
law. Hence the Constitution allows the adjournment of Congress to
change the duty of the Executive: if he disapproves of certain bills
which reach him during the last ten days of the session, he need not
return them, but may keep them in his pocket, and if they stay there
over the adjournment (and are not signed), they do not become law.10
That, it seems to me, is the effect of the words "in which case it
shall not be law"; they are simply an exception to the requirement
that bills kept for ten days become law without the approval of the
President. An abrupt transition of thought is necessary if the limita-
tion is taken to be absolute. The purpose of the whole provision is
to achieve a nice adjustment between the executive and congressional
parts of the legislative machinery. This would not be disturbed by
allowing the executive mechanism to function after the congressional
wheels had stopped, and so far as I can see, there is nothing in the
Constitution to prevent it.
In its essentials the approval or disapproval of a bill is a legislative
act, 1 but there is no reason why it must be completed before the
adjournment of Congress. The passage of a bill, even during the
intended, upon his qualified negative, if he might silently decline to act after
a bill was presented to him for approval or rejection. The Constitution, there-
fore, has wisely provided, that, 'if any bill shalf not be returned by the Presi-
dent within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented
to him, it shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it.' But if this
,clause stood alone, Congress might, in like manner, defeat the due exercise of
his qualified negative by a termination of the session, which would render it
impossible for the President to return the bill. It is therefore added, 'unless
the Congress, by their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall
not be a law.'" I Story, Commentaries on the Constitution (5th ed. i8gi)
sec. 891.
"0It was formerly the custom, in cases of "pocket vetoes" for the President
to communicate to Congress at the next session his reasons for failing to sign.
See 5 Hinds, Precedents (1907) 6618.
U "The veto power, which is possessed by the President, the governors of
all the states (except North Carolina), and the mayors of many cities, is
probably not an executive but a legislative power." Charles A. Beard, Veto
Power (1914) 3 Cyc. of Amer. Gov. 613. Cf. Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations (7th ed. 19o3) 218. A number of the cases in the state courts
discuss the executive or legislative character of the veto power. Thus,
the Supreme Court of California said that the law-making "power is a unit,
though distributed, and the parts can only act in Lnison. Whenever a part
ceases to act, the whole becomes inoperative. The executive act owes its
vitality to the existence of the legislative body." Fowler v. Pierce (1852) 2
Calif. 165. The other cases will be discussed later.
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closing hours of a session, shows that the legislature desires it to
become law. If the President does not approve it, the intention of
Congress is defeated, and if the bill. is a complicated one requiring
study or reference to experts, the adjournment ought not to deprive
the President of his discretion and his right to ten days' deliberation.
Unless the President has the power to approve bills after an adjourn-
ment, he must either act at once and unintelligently, or he cannot act
at all on measures which come to him late. From the standpoint of
policy, therefore, it would seem that there are strong considerations
in favor of President Wilson's innovation.
It is well settled that bills may be signed when Congress has
recessed-for a vacation running over the Christmas holidays, for
example. This practice has received the sanction of the Supreme
Court.12 While the decision leaves open the particular question which
President Wilson has raised, the duration of the recess makes no
difference. If, after a bill has been presented to the President, the
ten-day period comes to an end during the recess, it does not matter
whether the vacation is long enough to enjoy the Yuletide or to
attend the political conventions and campaign for reElection. The
only real difference between a recess and an adjournment is that in
the first case a session of Congress is temporarily interrupted, whereas
in the latter case the second session of the Sixty-sixth Congress ended
on June 5th and the third session will begin in-December. Even this
difference is one of nomenclature and not of substance, for there is
no change in the status of legislative business.' s
Considerations of policy ought to outweigh this purely formal
difference. The President is entitled to ten days' deliberation on
measures which are sent to him, and if the bills signed by President
Wilson are valid, Congress, with its calendar terribly congested, will
be saved a great deal of time which would be taken up by the repas-
sage of these laws and of others which in the future might fail of
approval before adjournment. Furthermore, if neither an adjourn-
ment of a session nor an adjournment for a recess works any inter-
ference with the executive part of the legislative machinery, there
would seem to be no difference when a Congress adjourns while the
President has two years of his term ahead of him. In such a case,
if proposed statutes could not be considered maturely and, when it
seemed wise, validated by post-adjournment approval, the President
would be robbed of his discretion, or the completion of the legislative
act could not take place for nine months, unless there were a special
session. It would seem, therefore, looking only to the language of
'See La Abra Silver Mining Company v. United States (1899) I75 U. S.
423, 452, 20 Sup. Ct. 168, 178. Mr. Justice Harlan gives in the margin a long
list of the more recent statutes signed during recesses.
3 See Rules of the House of Representatives, No. XXVI [House Manual
and Digest (63d Cong., 3d sess.) 412, House Document No. 1556]. This question
will receive a further consideration later.
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the Constitution, that the single case in which President Wilson's
theory is not valid is when a Congress and a President's term come
to an end at the same time. The problem, however, has not been
considered so simple by those who have discussed the provision of
the Federal Constitution, although the state courts, interpreting grants
substantially similar to that in the federal instrument, are in very
general agreement that the practice is justified.
I. THE FEDERAL PRECEDENTS
In only one case-that of the Abandoned and Captured Property
Act of 18631*-had a bill been signed after the adjournment of Con-
gress, but the question has been mooted a number of times. A statute
concerning the Florida wreckers was in 1824 announced as having
been signed, but, through an inadvertence, did not actually have the
President's signature. Congress had adjourned, and the question was
discussed in the cabinet meeting as to whether the President could
sign.
"Wirt thought he could," wrote John Quincy Adams in his Diary.
"So- did I. The article of the Constitution concerning the signature
of the President to Acts of Congress was read and analyzed. Nothing
in it requiring that the President should sign while Congress are in
session.
"Calhoun said that uniform practice had established a practical
construction of the Constitution. I observed that the practice had
merely grown out of the precedents in the British Parliament. But
the principles were different. The King was a constituent part of
Parliament, and no Act of Parliament could be valid without the
King's approbation. But the President is not a constituent part of
Congress, and an Act of Congress may be valid as law without his
signature or assent."
Wirt suggested that since the President had examined the statute
he could date it as of that time; but, Adams records,
"the President seemed to be afraid of the captious and cavilling spirit
of the time; and that there might be misrepresentation of motives if
the Act should -be signed in this manner."15
It would, moreover, have been a bad practice, for frequently the exact
hour and minute at which bills become law-in the case of tariff acts,
for example--is of great importance."
14 12 Stat. at L. 82o.
"6 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (1875) 379, 380. See also E. I. Renick,
The Power of the President to Sign Bills after the Adjournment of Congress
(1898) 32 Am. L. REv. 2o8.
6 For a question of presidential approval as of the hour and minute of the
calendar day instead of the legislative day, see 4 Hinds, Precedents (i9o7)
sec. 3489.
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The validity of the approval of bills after Congress has adjourned
was apparently not discussed again until 1863,17 when eight days after
the end of the congressional session President Lincoln signed a bill
providing for "the collection of abandoned property and for the
prevention of frauds in the insurrectionary districts within the United
States." The date-March 12, 1863-was called to the attention of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and
on June II, 1864, this body reported its unanimous opinion that the
act was not in force.
In its report the Committee said that the President had. signed the
bill on the theory that the constitutional provision in question
"was designed more especially to prevent Congress from enacting laws
without the approval of the Executive, which might be done by the
passage of bills by the two Houses, followed by an adjournment,
before the President could examine and return them, were it not for
the declaration that in such cases the bills shall not be laws; and did
not relate to cases wherein the Executive should approve bills sent
to him by Congress within ten days, even though an adjournment
should occur before the return of the bills."
This contention, the Committee said, was plausible, but not convincing.
"The ten days' limitation contained in the section above quoted
refers to the time during which Congress remains in session and has
no application after adjournment. Hence, if the Executive can hold
a bill ten days after adjournment and then approve it, he can as well
hold it ten months before approval. This Nyould render the laws of
the country too uncertain, and could not have been intended by the
framers of the Constitution.
"The spirit of the Constitution evidently requires the performance
of every act necessary to the enactment and approval of laws to be
perfect before the adjournment of Congress." '
Enough has been said in the first part of this paper to indicate that
this interpretation of the constitutional provision is not convincing,
and that to give the President power to sign after an adjournment
' In June, 1833, Madison wrote Clay as follows: "It is obvious that the
Constitution meant to allow the President an adequate time to consider the bills,
etc., presented to him, and to make his objections to them, and, on the
other hand, Congress should have time to consider and overrule the objec-
tions. . . . But nothing short of the signature of the President, or a lapse
of ten days without a return of his objections, or an overruling of the objec-
tions by two-thirds of each House of Congress, can give legal validity to a
bill." 9 Writings of James Madison (9oo) 515. The bill in question provided
for the division among the states of the net proceeds of the sales of public
lands. For the circumstances surrounding Jackson's pocket veto (which was
the matter discussed between Madison and Clay) and his message returning
the bill at the opening of the next session of Congress, see i T. H. Benton,
Thirty Years' View (1854) 364.
" Cong. Globe (38th Cong., Ist sess.) 2820.
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does not mean that there would be the uncertainty that the Committee
report supposes: in any case the President's authority would come
to an end ten days after a bill had been submitted to him. In spite of
the action of the House judiciary Committee, Congress took no steps
to reenact the measure; rather did it consider the law as in force,"
and in the only judicial decision on the subject, the court upheld the
validity of a law signed during a congressional recess very largely
on the ground that the constitutionality of the measure signed by
President Lincoln after an adjournment had never been questioned.
The most elaborate judicial pronouncement on the question of
whether, in the language of the House Judiciary Committee, "the
spirit of the Constitution evidently requires the performance of every
act necessary to the enactment and approval of laws to be perfect
before the adjournment of Congress," is to be found in a decision
of the United States Court of Claims, United States v. Alice Weil.
20
An act creating a new jurisdiction in the Court of -Claims was signed
by the President on December 28, 1892, during a congressional recess,
2'
" Congress passed the act of July 2, 1864 (13 Stat. at L. 375) as amendatory
of the act "approved March 12, 1863."
(I894) 29 Ct. Cl. 523. In a previous case the Court of Claims noticed the
fact that the Abandoned and Captured Property Act had been signed after
an adjournment, but said "that the legislative, executive, and judicial depart-
ments of the Government tacitly and without question have acquiesced in the
validity of the statute thus approved." The court refused to express an
opinion on the validity of the law, as "the question is no longer of any practical
importance as to that act, since all litigation under its provisions has been
completed." Hodges v. United States (1883) i8 Ct. Cl. 700.
'1 27 Stat. at L. 409. The bill originated in the Senate and passed the House
of Representatives on December 14. It was signed by the Speaker and Presi-
dent of the Senate on December 15, and was presented to the President on
December 20. The ten days expired on December 31. Congress adjourned on
December 22 until January 4, 1893.
On December 28, 1892 (the day the bill was signed) Attorney General Miller
advised the President that his right to sign bills during a recess had been
settled in the affirmative by the United States Supreme Court decision in a
case arising under the Illinois Constitution (Seven Hickory v. Ellery, infra
note 58). This, however, did not decide the effect of a temporary adjournment
on unsigned bills, and the Attorney General advised "that bills coming to you
during the recess of Congress, or within ten days prior thereto, be signed or
vetoed as they meet your approval or disapproval, the bill, in case of veto,
being returned when Congress reconvenes, and allow any questions as to their
validity to be settled in court." 2o Op. Atty. Gen. 503, 507.
The opinion quotes memoranda which had been communicated to President
Hayes by Attorney General Devens on the question of whether a bill became
law when not signed by the President at the end of ten days which expired
during a recess. "There is no mode provided," said these notes, "by which
the President can during the recess communicate with the House, and one of
two results must follow: either the bill becomes a law when he has not had
the time prescribed by the Constitution for consideration and reflection upon
it, or else, Congress taking a recess under such circumstances and thus pre-
venting him from communicating with them, the bill does not become a law
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and its constitutionality was questioned on this ground. The court,
through Judge Nott, took the ground that the history of the Abandoned
and Captured Property Act of March 12, 1863,22 was decisive of the
question; that the three departments of the government
"have so concurrently affirmed the constitutionality of the act that
the authority of the President to approve a bill within the time pre-
scribed by the Constitution, but after the expiration of the Congress
which passed it, must be regarded as now settled."23
Of the report of the House Committee on the Judiciary that the
act was unconstitutional, Judge Nott said that the subsequent inaction
of Congress indicated "negatively, that a majority of the members
did not agree with the Committee on the Judiciary." But, positively,
there was evidence of the legislative judgment, for on July 2, 1864,
Congress amended and strengthened the statute, apparently taking its
constitutionality for granted,2'- and in dealing with the Court of
Claims, left untouched its jurisdiction over claims for captured
property.
25
judge Nott's outline of the incidents in which the validity of the
law was not questioned in the courts is not so convincing. In 1865
the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Mrs. Alex-
ander's Cotton said that the property in question "should have been
turned over to the agents of the Treasury Department to be disposed
of under the Act of March 12th, 1863."'26 Later, Mr. Justice Nelson,
because by their own act of adjournment they have prevented him from having
the time for consideration which is intended by the Constitution." (P. 5o5.)
For a notice by the President that he had approved certain bills during a
recess, see Cong. Rec. (52d Cong., 2d sess.) 301.
= 12 Stat. at L. 82o. ' See (1894) 29 Ct Cl. 527.
"The first section of the law declared "that sales of captured and abandoned
property under the Act approved March r2, x863, may be made at such places
as may be designated by the Secretary of the Treasury." 13 Stat. at L. 375.
'Act of July 4, 1864; 13 Stat, at L. 381. Other statutes which apparently
assured the constitutionality of the law were the following: 14 Stat. at L.
328, sec.-8; 15 Stat. at L. 243, 251; Rev. St., secs. 1050, 3689; 25 Stat, at L. IO75.
(1865, U. S.) 2 Wall. 404, 423. No question was raised as to the date of
the statute, but; said Judge Nott, "there are some questions which are always
before a court, questions which a court is bound to notice and bound to decide;
and among these is the question of its own jurisdiction. Consent can not
confer jurisdiction; the silence of parties does not justify a court in keeping
silent." 29 Ct. Cl. 532. But the chief question raised in the Supreme Court
Case was whether Mrs. Alexander's cotton was lawful inaritime prize and
subject to prize jurisdiction. The court did not depend on the Act of March
12, 2863, to hold that the-capture was lawful and that private property on land
was not maritime; but simply held that under this statute the cotton should
have been turned over to an agent of the Treasury Department, and that Mrs.
Alexander had two years in which to bring a suit for the proceeds of the sale.
It would seem possible, therefore, for the Supreme Court to have avoided
passing on the question of constitutionality.
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while noting the date of the President's signature, raised no objection 7
nor did Mr. Justice Davis,2 8 Chief Justice Chase, or Mr. Justice
Miller.2 9 But in none of these cases was the statute challenged on
the ground that the post-adjournment signature was invalid.
The remainder of judge Nott's opinion is taken up with an examina-
tion of the origins of the veto power, its use in England, its revisory
rather than legislative character, the kinship between the provisions
of the American Constitution and those of the New York Constitution,
and the failure of the debates at the time of the adoption of the Con-
stitution to indicate that the power of the President ended with or
continued after the adjournment of Congress.2 Arguing in this
fashion, Judge Nott held that a law signed during a congressional
recess was valid, and the decision was sustained by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
But it was sustained only as to the recess, and the opinion did not
consider the Act of March 12, 1863. "Whether the President can
sign a bill after the final adjournment of Congress for the session,"
said Mr. Justice Harlan, "is a question not arising in this case, and
has not been considered or decided by us." His reasons, however,
for holding that signature during a recess was valid would seem to
apply equally to signature after the adjournment of a session. The
Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Harlan said, could not impose upon the
Executive the restriction of exercising his power of approval only
on the days when the two Houses of Congress were actually sitting
and transacting public business.
"After a bill has been presented to the President, no further action
is required by Congress in respect of that bill unless it be disapproved
by him and within the time prescribed by the Constitution be returned
for reconsideration. It has properly been the practice of the President
to inform Congress by message of his approval of bills, so that the
fact may be recorded. But the essential thing to be done in order
that a bill may become a law by the approval of the President is that
it be signed within the prescribed time after -being presented to him.
That being done, and as soon as done, whether Congress is informed
'Ex porte Zeilner (1869, U. S.) 9 Wall. 244. See also Zellner's Case (1871)
7 Ct. Cl. 137.
United States v. Anderson (i869, U. S.) 9 Wall. 56.
United States v. Klein (1871, U. S.) 13 Wall. ,28. See also Carroll v.
United States, id. 151, Armstrong v. United States, id. 154, and Pargoud v.
United States, id. 156; United States v. Padelford (2869, U. S.) 9 Wall. 532.
'Judge Charles C. Nott was one of the reporters of the first forty-eight
volumes of the decisions of the Court of Claims (i867-I913). As footnotes.
to his opinion in the Weil case he published two laudatory letters which he
had received from jurists to whom he had sent copies of the opinion. Mr.
Justice Strong (who had resigned from the United States Supreme Court in
I88o) wrote that he thought the opinion "able, remarkably thorough, and
convincing. I concur heartily with it." Judge Thomas M. Cooley said that it
seemed to him "entirely sound and right." (1894) 29 Ct. C1. 523, 537, 546.
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or not by message from the President of the fact of his approval of
it, the bill becomes a law, and is delivered to the Secretary of State
as required by law.
"Much of the argument of counsel seems to rest upon the provision
in relation to the final adjournment of Congress for the session,
whereby the President is prevented from returning, within the period
prescribed by the Constitution, a bill that he disapproves and is unwill-
ing to sign. But the Constitution places the approval and disapproval
of bills, as to their becoming laws, upon a different basis. If the
President does not approve a bill, he is required within a named time
to send it back for consideration. But if by its action, after the
presentation of a bill to the President during the time given him by
the Constitution .for an examination of its provisions and for approving
it by his signature, Congress puts it out of his power to return it,
not approved, within that time to -the House in which it originated,
then the bill fails and does not become law."
31
In the margin of his opinion Mr. Justice Harlan instances a large
number of laws which were signed during recesses. This practice,
however, was questioned by at least one chief executive, President
Johnson. The Fortieth Congress, by concurrent resolution, took a
recess from March 30, 1867, to July 3, 1867. Through an oversight
a bill was not presented to the President until April ist. Johnson
refused to sign it but filed it in the State Department with the following
endorsement:
"It is not believed that the approval of any bill after the adjourn-
-ment of Congress, whether presented before or after such adjourn-
ment, is authorized by the Constitution of the United States, that
instrument expressly declaring that no bill shall become law the
return of which may have been prevented by the adjournment of
CGongress.32 To concede that, under -the Constitution, the President,
after the adjournment of Congress, may, without limitation in respect
to time, exercise the power of approval and thus determine at his
discretion whether or not bills shall become laws, might subject the
legislative and executive departments of the Government to influences
most pernicious to correct legislation and sound public morals, and,
-with a single exception, occurring during the prevalence of civil war,
would be contrary to the established practice of the Government from
.its inauguration to the present time. The bill will therefore be filed
in the office of the Secretary of State without my approval.
33
A resolution was introduced in the House of Representatives direct-
ingthe reEnrollment of the bill, signature by the Speaker and the
3"La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, supra note 12, at p. 454.
32 The Constitution says nothing of the sort. It is evident from the argument
in the first part of this article that the provision simply means that the adjourn-
ment of Congress prevefits bills from becoming law which are held for ten
days by the President without action.
'During the previous holiday recess, however, President Johnson signed a
military road bill on December 26th. See 14 Stat. at L. 374. The recess lasted
from December 2oth to January 3d.
POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO SIGN BILLS
President of the Senate, and presentation to the President so that the
defect might be cured. The Speaker of the House, Schuyler Colfax,
of Indiana, ruled that the proposer of the resolution had presented a
privileged question. If, the Speaker said, the House had really
adjourned for the session, "there is no question that the President
would not have -the power to sign the bill." But only a recess had
been taken. The power of signing bills during such a period "has
been exercised frequently, and as well by the present occupant of the
Presidential chair as .by his predecessors." The Speaker thought that
the House might direct the re~nrollment of the bill.3 4
In 1868 Johnson raised another question concerning the signature
of bills during a recess. The Senate had inquired by resolution
concerning S. 141, "for the further security of equal rights in the
District of Columbia."35 The bill had been presented to the President
on December 1i, 1867, and on December 2oth, before the expiration of
ten days, Congress by concurrent resolution adjourned until January
6th. Johnson, therefore, gave the measure a pocket veto.
"Congress by their adjournment thus prevented the return of the
bill within the time prescribed by the Constitution and it was therefore
left in the precise condition in. which that instrument positively declares
a bill 'shall not be a law.' "6
Johnson's message was referred to the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 7 and on February 17, 1868, Senator Edmunds reported,
with the unanimous approval of the Committee, a bill (S. 366)
"regulating the presentation of bills to the President and the return
of the same." This bill construed adjournment as used in the Con-
stitution to mean the final adjournment of a session and not adjourn-
ment to a particular day. If the President desired to veto a bill
within ten days after it had been submitted to him, but during a recess,
he could file his objections with the Secretary of the Senate or the
Clerk of the House of Representatives. This was a sufficient "return
with objections" as the Constitution required. The bill provided,
furthermore, that if ten days elapsed during a recess and bills were
"The resolution directing the re~nrollment of the bill was passed by the
House, but not by the Senate. See House Journal (4oth Cong., 1st sess.)
i7o; Cong. Globe, 510, 512, 586. See also 4 Hinds, Precedents (i9o7) sec. 3493.
Cong. Globe (40th Cong., 2d sess.) 72o.
'Other bills were similarly affected by recesses from March 3o, 1867, to the
first Wednesday in July, 3867, and from July 2o to November 21, 1867. John-
son, it should be said, was influenced in his plea as to lack of power to sign
during a recess by the fact that he was at odds with Congress and disapproved
of the bills in question. This disapproval was shown by pocket vetoes on the
plea that he could not constitutionally sign after the adjournment and did
not have time for sufficient consideration before adjournment.
'In the debate Senators Edmunds and Sumner stressed the point that i
recess adjournment was not like an adjournment sine die.
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not signed by the President or returned, they should become law
without his signature.3 8
There would seem to be considerable doubt about the constitu-
tionality of this last provision. If the recess is effected by adjourn-
ment, then surely Congress cannot provide that bills not signed
may become law, since that would be clearly in violation of the plain
provision of the Constitution. In practice, the pocket veto is rarely
if ever exercised during a recess, but it would seem to be beyond the
power of Congress to interfere. Johnson's attitude, against which
the proposed bill was directed, marks the extreme interpretation of
the President's powers during a recess. Mr. Justice Harlan fully
established signature in such a case, but it remains true that in only
one instance before President Wilson, has the right to sign after an
adjournment been successfully asserted. In 1887 President Cleve-
land was urged to sign the river and harbor bill, which came to him
so late in the session that he could not consider it maturely, but he
apparently concluded that after Congress had adjourned he did not
have the power to give his approval.
3 9
III. DECISIONS IN THE STATE COURTS
While the question of the validity of measures approved after an
adjournment of Congress was undecided by the Supreme Court of
the United States, numerous state cases,
40 arising under provisions
exactly or substantially similar to that in the Federal Constitution,
have held that governors have the power which President Wilson has
exercised. These decisions have widely varying merit; their reason-
ing-when it can be discovered-is different, and they have little, if
any, authority so far as the power of the President is concerned. But
their cumulative effect is to show that on grounds of policy the state
executives-and equally the federal executive-ought to have time
after the adjournment of the legislature to consider the great mass
of measures sent to them during the closing hours of the session.
41
" The bill passed the Senate on March 24th by a vote of 29 to ii, but was
not acted on in the House. Cong. Globe (4oth Cong., 2d sess.) 1204, 137, 1404,
1834, 1840, 2078. See also 4 Hinds, Precedents (i9o7) sec. 3494.
" "It was, however, announced at the time, and there can be no doubt of
the correctness of the report, that Mr. Cleveland had taken the advice of Mr.
Garland, his Attorney General, on this subject, and concluded he was without
power to sign the bill. It is understood that Mr. Garland based his opinion
solely upon the ground that the President was a part of Congress in this
respect and that his participation in legislation necessarily lapsed with the
adjournment of that body." E. I. Renick, op. cit. note 15, at p. 212.
, These state cases are considered by J. D. Barnett, The Executive Control
of the Legislature (907) 41 AM. L. REv. 215; E. I. Renick, op. cit. note 15;
and in a note to Detroit v. Chapin (i895) io8 Mich. 69o, 66 N. W. 587, 37
L. R. A. 391.
Many of the state constitutions specifically allow signature after adjourn-
ment, the time limits varying from three to thirty days. Some do away with
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Only in the earliest state cases was any material doubt expressed
as to the post-adjournment power of the governor. In 1791 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts gave the Senate an opinion
2
which intimated that a measure could not become law after an adjourn-
ment which was final, with no subsequent meeting on that adjourn-
ment; a temporary adjournment, the court said, would be a different
matter, but here the question was not one of signature, but whether a
bill would become law without signature after -being held for five
days, the time which the Massachusetts Constitution allowed for con-
sideration.4 3 This distinction was followed in an advisory opinion
by the New Hampshire Court."
The first fiat denial of the power was in a California case.45 The
court based its objections on two grounds. In the first place, it said,
if the executive could approve an act after adjournment, he could do
it within one day or one month, and very great uncertainty would
result. The laiguage of the California constitution was similar to
that in the federal instrument, and the court held that the ten-day
limit applied only when it expired before adjournment and allowed a
bill to become law without approval. But of more importance to the
court seemed to be the theory that the executive was acting as part
of the legislative branch of the government :46
"This power is a unit, though distributed; and the parts can only
act in unison. Whenever a part ceases to act, the whole becomes
inoperative. The executive act owes its vitality to the existence of
the "pocket veto" and in cases of disapproval require the governor's reasons
to be filed with the Secretary of State. See Index Digest of State Constitu-
tions (N. Y. State Constitutional Convention Commission, i915) 848-851.
There are some general remarks on such provisions in N. H. Debel, The Veto
Power of the Governor of Illinois (1917) 80 ff.
Opinion of the Justices (1791) 3 Mass. 567.
"Constitution of Massachusetts, Part II, Art. II. Art. I of the Amendments
settled any doubt by providing as follows: "If any bill or resolve shall be
-objected to, and not approved by the governor'; and if the general court shall
adjourn within five days after the same shall have been laid before the
governor for his approbation, and thereby prevent his returning it with his
objections, as provided by the constitution, such bill or resolve shall not become
a law, nor have force as such." See 3 Thorpe, American Charters, Constitu-
tions, and Organic Laws (igog) 1893, I911.
"Opinion of the Justices (1864) 45 N. H. 607. In Johnson City v. Tenn.
Eastern Electric Co. (i916) 133 Tenn. 632, 182 S. W. 587, it was held that
adjournment meant a final adjournment. The governor kepf a bill for 33 days
during 30 of which the legislature was in recess and then vetoed it. The court
said that the bill became law, since the governor could have returned it with
his objections to an officer of the House of Representatives in which the
measure originated. The Tennessee Constitution gave the governor five days
to approve or disapprove of measures and if he took no action, they became law.
"Fowler v. Pierce (1852) 2 Calif. x65.
"On this question of the legislative or executive character of the governor's
act see Boyd v. Deal (1888) 24 Fla. 293, 4 So. 899; Opinion of Justices (887)
23 Fla. 298, 6 So. 925; and Arnold v. McKellar (1877) 9 S. C. 335.
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the legislative body. Upon the adjournment of that body, the power
ceases and all acts of a legislative nature are void."'47
Substantially the same view was taken in Nevada. The organic
act gave the governor the power to "approve all laws passed by the
Legislative Assembly before they take effect" and vested "the legis-
lative power and authority" of the territory "in the Governor and
Legislative Assembly." The court refused to recognize as law a bill
approved after the adjournment of the legislature because the gov-
ernor formed one branch of the legislative body, and
"no bill can become law until it has received the sanction of three
distinct legislative branches.
"If we are to consider the Governor as constituting one branch of
the Legislative body, it would seem more reasonable to hold that he
could do no legislative act after the other two branches had adjourned
and ceased to exist as a legislative body."
4 8
A different interpretation, however, was given language in the New
York Constitution exactly similar to the Federal provision. The New
York Court of Appeals 9 declared that the proviso "in which case
it shall not be a law" should be interpreted as relating
"exclusively to bills which the Governor has neglected to approve and
sign. It is such bills, and not those which he has approved and signed,
which are not to become law on account of a premature adjournment
of the legislature. The provision does not qualify the mandate con-
tained in the earlier part of the section, by which it is enjoined upon
the governor that, if he approves of a bill, he shall sign it. I am,
therefore, of the opinion that there is nothing in the language of the
Constitution forbidding the approving and signing of a bill by the
governor, after the session of the legislature shall have terminated by
an adjournment."
The court said that if this power was not legally the governor's, it
must be on account of the general arrangement of the constitution
or on account of the nature of the act performed. But the constitu-
tion, the court declared, intends that a concurrence of legislative and
' But see Harpending v. Haight (I87o) 39 Calif. I89, which held that adjourn-
ment from day to day did not prevent the governor from returning a bill with
his objections after the ten day period had elapsed.
"'Trustees of School District No. i v. County Commissioners of Ormsby
County (1865) I Nev. 334. In Miller v. Hurford (1881) II Neb. 377, 9 N. W.
477, the court held that a bill presented to the governor shortly before an
adjournment and held by him longer than the time allowed for consideration
(three days) became law, since the constitutional provision (which followed
the federal one) applied only to adjournments sine die and not from time to
time.
"People v. Bowen (186o) 21 N. Y. 517. The bill in question was passed by
the Senate on April 13, 1855; the legislature adjourned on April 14 and the
Governor gave his approval on April 17.
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executive branches shall ordinarily be necessary to enact a statute
and that the legislature alone (by two-thirds majorities) will suffice
when the executive disapproves, or that the one passage by the legis-
lature will be effective when the executive fails to act for ten days.
There is nothing in this arrangement, the court said, which is upset
by post-adjournment approval. The framers of the constitution
thought that ten days were long enough f6r the performance of the
executive duty of approval or rejection, and the court was inclined to
hold that "he would not be justified in acting on a bill after his ten
days had elapsed, whether the session continued or not." But even
if the period were indefinite there would be no "reason for adding
to the constitution, by a judicial determination, a qualification of the
power of the governor to approve bills which is not contained in the
instrument."
The argument as to the nature of the governor's act, the court said,
raised "rather a dispute about terms, than one touching the substance
of things." It would be incorrect to say that the governor formed
a branch of the legislature, but he nevertheless participated in the
enactment of laws, and the legislative or executive character of his
power was immaterial. An adjournment of the legislature affected
this power in only one case: if the governor disapproved of a bill, he
could not state his objections to the legislature as required by the
constitution when the legislature was in session; the bill objected to
would be dead."
This is the most intelligently reasoned opinion in the state decisions;
the courts of other states have not improved on the logic of the New
York Court of Appeals, but they have not made it any less forcible.
The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed itself. After holding in
I874 ' that "The Governor can do no legislative act nor perform
any legislative function after the final adjournment of the legislature,"
a different set of judges made a handsome denial of judicial infal-
libility.
"We have no hesitation to overrule this decision, which is not
supported by reason or authority, and plainly shows a lack of attention
to or comprehension of the language of the constitution.
5 2
'The opinion in the case in the New York Supreme Court, People v. Bowen
(1859) 3o Barb. 24, said that of the bills passed at the 1855 session, 55 had been
signed by the Governor after the adjournment of the legislature. Of the presi-
dential practice which was presented in the argument, Judge Sutherland said
that "in view of the magnitude of the interest involved, I should hesitate to
consider the practice at Washington [non-signature] of controlling weight, did
I deem the question more doubtful than I think it to be from the constitutional
provision itself." (P. 35.)
'Hardee v. Gibbs (1874) 50 Miss. 802.
S ate v. County of Coahoma (1887) 64 Miss. 358, i So. 5o. The Constitu-
tion of Mississippi was later amended and expressly prohibited the approval
of a bill when the legislature was not in session (sec. 72). Carter v. Henry
YALE LAW JOURNAL
In Maryland, the constitutional provision being similar to that of the
United States, it was held that a law is valid if signed after adjourn-
ment, but within six days of the time at which it was actually pre-
sented to the governor. It made no difference that owing to the great
number of laws passed the measure in question was not presented
until some time after adjournment.53
The Constitution of Michigan5' repeated-the language of the federal
instrument and then provided that the governor could sign within five
days after adjournment all bills passed during the last five days of
the session. The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the validity of an
act passed previous to the last five days of the session, and not
approved 'by the governor until after adjournment, but within the
ten-day period. To hold otherwise, the.court said,
"would be to give a bill passed the fifth day before adjournment the
full period of ten days within which it might be signed, while bills
passed one day earlier would have but five. No reason is suggested
for such a discrimination, and to our minds it is more reasonable that
the convention should have supposed that all bills were to be signed
within ten days after passage, except those passed during the last
five days, which were to be disposed of within five days after
adjournment.""5
Here, it is evident, the state constitution negatived the theory that
the governor's "legislative" power of approval ended with the
adjournment of the legislature. So also another form of state con-
stitution, by doing away with pocket vetoes, would seem by implica-
tion to give the power to sign after an adjournment. Thus, the
(9o5) 87 Miss. 411, 39 So. 69o, dealt with the method of computing the time
which the Governor was allowed for approval and a similar question was raised
in State v. Town of South Norwalk (I904) 77 Conn. 257, 58 AtI. 759.
Lankford v. County Commissioners (-89o) 73 Md. 105, 20 AtI. io17. There
was a dissenting opinion which 'had little force. "The language is plain and
explicit, and every provision of this section shows, it seems to me, that the
constitution means that every bill shall be presented to and signed by the
Governor during the session of the Legislature. Otherwise, if it meant that
bills should be presented and signed by him after the adjournment of the
Legislature, provision would have been made for fixing a time within which
such bills should be presented and signed" (p. x26). In Johnson v. Luers
(1916) 129 Md. 523, 79 AtI. 71o, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a
law was valid when presented to the governor on April i4th and signed on
April i8th, the legislature having adjourned -on April 3d. During the closing
days of this session, soo bills were passed. The governor had them presented
to him one at a time after the adjournment.
"Art. IV, sec. 14.
'Detroit v. Chapin (1895) io8 Mich. 69o, 66 N. W. 587. In Burns v. Sewall
(i892) 48 Minn. 425, 51 N. W. 224, it was held that a similar constitutional
provision "does not confer on the governor power to approve bills after the
adjournment, for he would have it without the clause, but it is a limitation
upon his power, restricting its exercise to the period of three days after the
legislature shall adjourn."
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Louisiana Constitution was similar to the federal one, with the added
proviso that if the return of a bill with objections was prevented by
adjournment, the governor should return it on the first day of the
next general assembly. The court held that bills could be signed at
any time during the adjournment.5 The same question of a sus-
pensory veto implying that the governor had power to approve after
an adjournment of the legislature was raised under the Illinois Con-
stitution. The governor was allowed to return a bill with his objec-
tions on the first day of the following session, and "failing in this,
the bill becomes a law." The court held that he could sign while the
legislature was not in session. "Is not this," they asked, " a
reasonable and common-sense view of the subject?"
57
In i88o a case was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States
which declared that the post-adjournment action by the Illinois Gov-
ernor was valid."8 Chief Justice Waite had "no hesitation in saying"
that the governor could sign, for the reason, apparently, that "there
is certainly no express provision of the Constitution to the contrary."
The Court noticed, but did not attach any decisive importance to the
fact that unless a bill was returned with objections at the next session
of the legislature, it would become law. In the case before the
Supreme Court,
"the bill was approved and signed within ten days, and, therefore
as we think, it became a law from the date of the approval, notwith-
standing the legislature was not in session at the time."
59
Under such a constitutional provision, however, it would not seem
that the ten-day limit applies to post-adjournment approval, but that
the governor could affix his signature at any time before the day on
which the Constitution requires him to return the bill with his objec-
tions. If inaction on the governor's part is sufficient to validate the
bill, it is difficult to see what objection there is to affirmative action.
'State ex rel. Belden v. Fagan (187o) 22 La. Ann. 545. The Indiana Con-
stitution provided that if a "general adjournment" prevented the return of a
bill with objections, it should become law "unless the Governor within five
days next after such adjournment, shall file such bill, with his objections thereto,
in the office of the Secretary of State." Tarlton v. Peggs (1862) i8 Ind.
24. See also Stalcup et at. v. Dixon (1893) 136 Ind. 9, 35 N. E. 987.
"People v. Hatch (1863) 33 Ill. 9. The Illinois Constitution of 1848 did
away with pocket vetoes and the governor's power of disapproval was purely
suspensory. See N. H. Debel, op. cit. note 41, at p. 53 ff.
Seven Hickory v. Ellery (i88o) 1o3 U. S. 423.
Citing with approval People v. Bowen, supra note 49; State ex rel. Belden
v. Fagan, supra note 56; and Solomon v. Commissioners of Cartersville (i87o)
41 Ga. 157, which held that if an original question had been presented, the
court would have been inclined to hold that the governor could not sign any
bill after an adjournment. But the usage and practice had been for the executive
to sign bills within five days after an adjournment and the court was willing to
recognize this. In this case, however, the law was declared invalid; it was
signed more than two months after its passage.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing examination of the constitutional provision, the
federal precedents, and the state decisions does not disclose any reason
why President Wilson's innovation of signing bills after the adjourn-
ment of Congress, but within ten days of their receipt, is not perfectly
valid. Rather are there strong considerations of policy in favor of
such a practice. 0 As the Attorney General suggested in his opinion,
"it may well be that occasion for the serious consideration of" the
President's power "did not arise until, within comparatively recent
times, the amount and far reaching detail of federal legislation, and
consequently of such legislation passed within the last io days of the
session, became such as to make it a real burden upon the President
and a danger to the public interests to require him to sign such bills
as he approved during the confusion of the last hours of Congress."8 1
If the question is argued from precedent, the answer can be deter-
mined, I think, by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States which held that the President could sign bills during a recess.
As I have already suggested, except with reference to the numerical
designation of the session there is no difference between a temporary
and final adjournment of a session of the federal legislature, and the
decisions which attempt to distinguish between the two, mistake the
penumbra for the substance.
Although it is not evident from the opinions, such a misconception
is understandable, since in England prorogation of Parliament
terminates all pending business. Powers given -by the two Houses to
"Not only is the letter of the Constitution in favor of this view, but it
certainly is in the interest of good legislation that it should prevail. Otherwise,
two practical evils result. One is, that a good measure, approved by Congress,
President, and everybody else, may fail, because the President cannot consider
it before the arbitrary time of twelve o'clock, noon, of March 3, to which
arbitrary period of time the Constitution in no way limits him. The second is,
that with a rush of bills piling up on his desk in the last few days before
adjournment, the President, in his reluctance to stand in the way of a general
legislation of Congress, is liable, hastily, and as a mere perfunctory act, to
sign bills which, on examination, he finds he does not approve." J. D. Long,
op. cit. noto 5, at p. 262.
'Power of President to Approve Bills after Adjournment sine die of the
Congress (June xg, 592o) 32 tOp. Atty. Gen. 225. President Wilson evidently
acted on an informal opinion from the Attorney General, since the announce-
ment from the White House was issued on June 18th.
The Attorney General's opinion draws no distinction between the adjourn-
ment of a session and the adjournment of a Congress, and is little more than
a summary, with quotations, of some of the decisions. "In my judgment,
therefore," he says, "the action of Presidents Lincoln and Harrison in actually
approving of bills during an adjournment of Congress outweighs any inference
which may be drawn from the mere failure of other Presidents to assert the
right claimed.' But Harrison approved during a recess and the single precedent
is the Abandoned and Captured Property Act.
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committees are extinguished and legislative stages reached by a bill
not yet finally passed and given royal assent are annulled. On the
other hand,
"The adjournment of either House takes place at its own discretion,
unaffected by the proceedings of the other House. Business pending
at the time of the adjournment is taken up at the point at which it
dropped when the House meets again.
862
At first Congress attempted to follow the English rule, but the
delays and inconveniences were so great that in i816 a joint committee
recommended a change. Two years later the House of Representatives
-decided that House bills not acted upon before an adjournment should
be continued at the next session after six days, and in 1848 a joint
rule was adopted. In i86o the House abandoned the Parliamentary
practice of having the powers of committees extinguished by proroga-
tion. The six-day limitation has now been given up and although,
since the revision of the rules in 1876, there have been no definite
provisions for the continuance of business not before committees,83
the practice is so well established that no question is ever raised.64
Bills referred to conference at one session can be reported to Con-
gress at the next,8 5 and even where one House asks for a conference
"J. G. Swift MacNeill, Adjournments and Prorogations, Manchester Guardian
(wkly. ed.) December i9, igig. "The Crown," says Mr. MacNeill, "cannot
make either House adjourn; it has sometimes signified its pleasure that the
Houses adjourn, and although no instance has occurred in which either House
has refused to adjourn, the communication might be disregarded. The pleasure
of the Crown that the Houses should adjourn was last signified on the 1st
March, 1814, and it is probable that the practice will not be revived.
It may be stated with sufficient accuracy that the only Parliamentary
1proceedings which remain untouched by a prorogation are impeachments-
there has not been an impeachment since i8os-and appeals to the House of
Lords, which are heard and decided under the provisions of statutes." Pro-
posals have been made to have'legislative business unaffected by prorogation,
-but it is urged that the reintroduction of bills affords opportunities to cure
defects which cannot be taken care of in committee, and "that the effect of
the proposed change upon legislation in the Houses of Parliament would be
distinctly deleterious."
'Rule XXVI of the House of Representatives is as follows: "All business
before committees of the House at the end of one session shall be resumed
at the commencement of the next session of the same Congress in the same
manner as if no adjournment had taken place." See House Manual and Digest
[note '3, supra] sec. LI, par. 581-585.
"5 Hinds, Precedents (i9o7) sec. 6727.
"5 id. sees. 626o-6262. At the last session of Congress, for example, the Oil
Land Leasing Law (Public 146; February 25, 1920) was reported from the con-
ference committee on February io. It had passed the Senate on September 3,
i919, and the House on October 30. The water power bill (Public 280; June
10, 192o) passed the House of Representatives on July i. i919, and the Senate
on January 15, i92o. The Esch-Cummins Railroad Reorganization Law (Public
152; February 28, 1920) was passed by the House at the first, and by the Senate
at the second session of the Sixty-sixth Congress.
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at one session, the other House can agree to it at the next session
with no further action by the other branch."
8  Finally-and this would
seem to be conclusive-bills enrolled and signed by the presiding
officers of the two Houses at the close of a session, have been sent
to the President and approved at the beginning of 
the next sessionY.6
Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion6
8 applied only to bills signed during a
recess and he expressly refused to pass judgment on the problem which
this article considers. The legislative practice of Congress, however,
in making no distinction except a numerical one between adjournment
for a recess and adjournment of a session, would seem to indicate that
the bills signed by President Wilson are constitutional.
The question is slightly different when Congress adjourns, but
even in this case there would seem to be no sound reason why post-
adjournment signature is not valid if the term of the President does
not come to an end at the same time. The end-the approval of bills
passed by Congress-is legitimate and within the scope of the Con-
stitution; and the means used-signature by the President after
Congress has adjourned-are appropriate and are not prohibited.
9
"5 id. sec. 6286. V4 id. secs. 3486-3488.
I La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, supra note 12.
M'Culloch v. Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat. 316, 421. E. C. Mason, author
of The Veto Power, supra note 6, the most elaborate study of the President's
power of approving and disapproving legislation, is of the opinion that "There
is nothing in the Constitution to prevent the President from signing a bill
after the adjournment of Congress. The only provision is in regard to bills
which the President leaves unsigned; these cannot become law if Congress,
by its adjournment, cuts short the ten days allowed the executive for the con-
sideration of bills. Nor is there any consideration of parliamentary law which
demands that Congress should be in session when a bill is signed. Congres-
sional jurisdiction over a bill ceases when it is sent to the President for his
signature, and there is no legal method of recovering possession of the subject
other than by a subsequent act of repeal passed under the usual forms. [But
for bills which have been sent to the President and withdrawn by Congress,
see 4 Hinds, Precedents (1907) sec. 3507.] The act is not even returned to
Congress, but is deposited by the President in the State Department" (p. iis).
Previously, however, Mr. Mason had said, "The Constitution provides that no
bill shall become law which is presented to the President within ten days of
the end of a session of Congress, unless it be signed and returned to Congress
before adjournment" (P6 113). Such a meaningless statement casts doubt on
Mr. Mason's authority in the matter under consideration.
